The NYC Administrative Code transferred liability from New York City to the abutting landowner for falls on sidewalks. In this case the plaintiff broke his leg on a pedestrian ramp. The Court ruled that the ramp was not part of the sidewalk and dismissed the case against the landowner. Read about this trip and fall case here.
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In the Matter of Jeffrey Katz, etc. et al. v County of Suffolk
In this case, Suffolk County appeals a decision from the Supreme Court “…which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.”
In January, 1997, Jeffrey Katz, the infant Plaintiff, was allegedly injured when the 2nd floor bathroom collapsed beneath him. Suffolk County held the tax deed on the subject property since March 1994, at the time of the occurrence collected the monthly rent from Jeffrey Katz’s mother, Diane Katz.
According to County Law § 53(2), if a county has acquired a property by a tax tile then they may not be held liable for torts “…by reason of such property being defective, out of repair, unsafe or dangerous, unless the county is in the actual physical possession, control and operation thereof as owner….”
The court acknowledged that the Defendant collected rent from Diane Katz, therefore the Defendant has a direct income from the property. The Plaintiff, then, needed to establish that the Defendant “…either created or had actual or constructive notice on the condition.” Constructive notice is a defect that is visible for a sufficient period of time before the actual accident occurred.
The evidence provided by the County was insufficient to establish prima facie and the County did not have actual or constructive notice. Therefore the motion for summary judgment and the complaint was dismissed.
To read about more Personal Injury cases go to http://www.negligenceatty.com/home
In this New York car accident case the defendant’s moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim alleging that the Plaintiff did not suffer a serious injury. The defendant’s doctor failed to give an opinion as to whether the plaintiff was unable to do the ordinary and usual activites within the first 90 out of 180 days following the accident. Therefore, the court ruled that the defendant’s motion should be denied and the case continue. Read about this case here.
Matter of Ferraro v North Babylon Union Free School District
In this personal injury case, the infant plaintiff who suffers from developmental delays and other disabilities alleged that he injured himself while operating a heavy, self-closing door at a school in North Babylon Union Free School District (hereinafter the district) while attending a Western Suffolk BOCES (hereinafter BOCES) special education program. Plaintiff caught one of his fingers in the door hinge. This action to recover damages for personal injuries was commenced against the district and BOCES on the grounds of negligent supervision, alleging that plaintiff should not have been allowed to operate the door unsupervised.
Supreme Court denied defendant, BOCES’, motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint alleging negligent supervision. BOCES then appealed the decision and plaintiffs cross-appealed. Since the infant passed out of the district’s orbit of authority while attending the BOCES program, which had been arranged by the district, the Court was correct in granting the branch of the district’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint alleging negligent supervision.
Although BOCES met the prima facie burden of proving it adequately supervised plaintiff, the plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact in opposition. Due to the infant plaintiff’s documented serious developmental delays, a triable issue of fact lies in whether BOCES was negligent in permitting him to operate a heavy, self-closing door unsupervised.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order as appealed and cross-appealed from with one bill of costs to defendant North Babylon Union School Free District.
For other interesting information in the personal injury file go to www.negligenceatty.com.
To read about Article 78 cases go to http://www.sheerinlaw.com/?id=78.
MUNOZ V. UPTOWN PARADISE
In a slip and fall case the Appellate Division First Department held that there was a triable issue of fact where a florist or his employees had sufficient notice of water on the floor of the shop prior to the plaintiff slipping. Additionally, the owner of the shop testified that it was a common practice for the employees to shake water off flowers and onto the floor when moving the flowers and assembling floral arrangements. Accordingly, the judges determined that there were enough issues of fact to have this case go to trial and be decided by a jury.
Read the entire case here http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_00001.htm
Demetria Singleton participated in a “Stop and Frisk” training exercise conducted in a basement. Ms. Singleton played the role of perpetrator for Probationary Police Officers. During the drill, one of the Probationary Police Officers was encouraged to be aggressive and he swept Ms. Singleton’s legs from under her causing her to strike her knee on the concrete floor. The impact resulted in a ruptured left anterior cruciate ligament, torn lateral meniscus, and a herniated disc. Ms. Singleton was left fully disabled after two surgeries. Since employees are entitled to a safe workplace and this exercise could have been performed in the Police Academy with proper padding, the Court ruled in Ms. Singleton’s favor awarding her $2.4 million for past pain and $6 million for future suffering.
In an unrelated case, Police Officer Irma Mendez-Leguillos was awarded $2.6 million for her pain and suffering caused by a 350-pound file cabinet falling and crushing her hand. The Police Department was aware that the file cabinet was a problem but instead of replacing it, they merely moved it to another office.
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Matter of Schreiber-Cross v State of New York
In this New York car accident case, plaintiff’s decedent was killed in a two-car accident at the intersection of Route 25A and Columbia in Port Jefferson Station. Claimant asserted seven allegations of negligence against the State of New York, six of which pertained to the design and/or maintenance of the traffic control device location at the intersection, or the intersection itself.
Less than two weeks prior to the scheduled trial date, claimant switched attorneys and submitted a motion for partial summary judgment and leave to amend the bill of particulars and change the designation of the claimant’s expert. This motion was returned for being in violation of the court-imposed deadlines. Claimant then brought about an Article 78 appeal for consideration of the motion. The Court of Claims denied the motion in toto which resulted in the claimant moving for recusal of the Court of Claims judge. The Court denied the motion. A trial commenced with the outcome of the claim being dismissed.
Claimant then appealed, asserting that the record established the traffic control device was the proximate cause of the accident and that the Court of Claims erred in denying the branches of the motion for leave to amend the bill of particulars and to substitute its designated expert. Evidence supported the Court’s determination that the claimant failed to establish the State was negligent in maintaining the traffic signal. The proposed new expert was going to testify on how the decedent’s head trauma was due to the guardrail placement and not place much emphasis on the traffic signal.
The Court of Claims had the task of determining whether the relief sought was contrary to prior representations made by claimant’s prior counsel and to balance the rights of the litigants against the demands of its calendar. Changing attorneys right before a trial begins is not considered a sufficiently exceptional circumstance that would limit the discretion of the Court.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment.
If you need a lawyer to represent you in your New York car accident case, please contact Kevin P. Sheerin toll free at 888-998-9984.
Dinardo v City of New York
In this New York personal injury case, plaintiff Zelinda Dinardo, a special education teacher, sought to recover damages for injuries sustained while attempting to protect one of her students from attack by another student with a history of aggressive and disruptive behavior. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of plaintiff in April 2008 and respondents appealed.
Respondents argued that plaintiff’s claim should fail because it was based on the Board of Education’s alleged negligence in the placement and transfer of a student. Contrary to respondents’ contention, the issue at hand was that the school administrators failed to follow through with the transfer request in a timely fashion. Additionally, evidence disproves the Board’s argument denying liability due to no knowledge of previous violent outbursts by the student who attacked the plaintiff.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal without costs and affirmed the judgment awarding plaintiff damages in the amount of $512,465.
If you need a lawyer to represent you in your New York personal injury case, please contact Kevin P. Sheerin toll free at 888-998-9984.
Collazo v Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority
In this New York accident case, plaintiff, Joehau Collazo, appeals against a decision in favor of defendants Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority and moves for a new trial. In October 2007, defendants were granted a motion for summary judgment dismissing the action against them leading to this appeal.
In April 2002, plaintiff contends he was walking in the eastbound crosswalk of Hillside Avenue and 167th Street when he was struck by a defendant MTA/Long Island Bus Company bus moving in the left turn lane in the westbound direction of Hillside Avenue. Plaintiff sustained injuries including broken bones and a traumatic brain injury resulting in permanent cognitive and emotional deficits. Defendants allege that plaintiff ran across the westbound traffic lanes between 166th and 167th Streets and then ran into defendants’ bus closer to 166th Street.
Plaintiff argues that the Verdict should be set aside for two reasons: the Court gave an erroneous instruction on the law and the Verdict was against the weight of evidence. According to the plaintiff, the Court erred in permitting the jury to consider defendants’ conduct in two different ways, using Vehicle and Traffic Law and New York City Traffic Regulations. Upon reviewing the circumstances, the Court found no basis to set aside the Verdict based on the Court’s instructions to the jury.
Concerning plaintiff’s claim that the weight of the evidence establishes that defendants’ bus entered the intersection of 167th Street and Hillside Avenue against a steady red light and then came into contact with plaintiff as he was walking in the eastbound crosswalk of Hillside Avenue, the Court has reasonable doubt that the plaintiff ran into the side of the bus per the defendants’ theory. Multiple testimonies support plaintiff’s version of the accident and based on the testimonial evidence, the Court feels that the Verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
Accordingly, the Court set the Verdict aside and required a new trial be set.
If you need a lawyer to represent you in your New York accident case, please contact Kevin P. Sheerin toll free at 888-998-9984.
Smith v Village of Rockville Centre
In this New York accident case, the plaintiff, Lisa Ann Smith, tripped and fell over uneven brick on a public sidewalk in the Village of Rockville Centre. Plaintiff brought about an action to recover damages for personal injuries she sustained due to her fall. The defendant, Village of Rockville Centre, made a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint which the Supreme Court denied. They then appealed this decision.
The Village provided evidence demonstrating that they lacked prior written notice of the dangerous condition in the sidewalk in order to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment. The plaintiff attempted to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the applicability of the “affirmative negligence exception” to the statutory rule requiring prior written notice but failed to produce evidence proving that work done by the Village’s contractor immediately caused the uneven brick condition.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the order, with costs, and granted appellant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.